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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Probation officers searched the residence of a probationer they suspected had relapsed on
heroin and absconded.  Mark Garnett was in the residence at the time of the search, having
stayed the prior night as a guest of the probationer’s boyfriend.  An officer found Mr. Garnett’s
closed and locked backpack in a storage area, bypassed the lock by severing an attached elastic
strap, opened the backpack, and discovered a handgun.  Mr. Garnett was subsequently charged
with being a felon in possession of a firearm and he filed a motion to suppress.  The district court
denied Mr. Garnett’s motion, finding the probation officer had a reasonable suspicion the
backpack belonged to the probationer, and that the search was therefore authorized by the
probationer’s Fourth Amendment waiver, or alternatively upon a reasonable suspicion that the
probationer violated the terms of her probation.  Mr. Garnett asserts the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mark Garnett by information with unlawful possession of a firearm
and with grand theft of a firearm,1 based upon a stolen gun being discovered in his closed and
locked backpack.  (R., pp.11-23, 29-33.)  Mr. Garnett filed a motion to suppress and a brief in
support, arguing in relevant part that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed and
locked backpack and that the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
1 The district court granted the State’s request to amend the grand theft of a firearm charge to
grand theft by possession of a stolen firearm.  (R., pp.132-134, 147-155, 165-169.)  The State
dismissed that charge after the jury could not reach a verdict on it, in exchange for Mr. Garnett
seeking no lower than a 3-year fixed term for the felon in possession of a firearm charge for
which he was convicted.  (R, pp.215, 263; Tr. 6/22/17, p.59, Ls.9-16.)  Mr. Garnett does not raise
any issues related to the grand theft charge in this appeal.
2
from unreasonable searches.  (R., pp.37-45.)  The State filed a response asserting the backpack
search was justified because it was found in Tamara Brunko’s residence, Ms. Brunko was on
probation at the time and had agreed to submit to searches of her residence and belongings, and
Ms. Brunko’s probation officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the terms of her
probation.  (R., pp.46-59.)
During a hearing on Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress, Andrew Soy testified that
probation officers searched the trailer he shared with his girlfriend, Ms. Brunko, who he knew to
be on probation, without a warrant and without his permission, in November of 2016.
(Tr. 3/21/17, p.6, L.6 – p.7, L.18; p.8, L.1 – p.9, L.17.)2  Mr. Soy and Mr. Garnett both testified
that Mr. Garnett had stayed over the previous night and was in the residence at the time of the
warrantless search.3  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.7, Ls.19-25; p.13, L.2 – p.14, L.6.)  Mr. Garnett testified that
he had suitcase and a backpack in the residence, that the backpack was closed and secured with a
padlock attached to cords which were in turn attached to the zippers, and that he placed the
backpack in the storage area of the trailer.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.14, L.7 – p.15, L.1; p.16, L.14 – p.17,
2 In its written order denying Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress, the district court referred to the
suppression hearing as having occurred on March 22, 2017.  (R., pp.98-116).  However, both the
Court Minutes and the transcript of the hearing indicate that the suppression hearing occurred on
March 21, 2017.  (R., pp.74-79; Tr. 3/21/17, p.3, L.13.)  Noting this discrepancy and for the sake
of consistency, Mr. Garnett will cite the transcripts of the suppression hearing as “Tr. 3/21/17” in
this Brief.
3 The parties litigated whether Mr. Garnett had standing to challenge the search of the residence
based upon his status as an overnight guest.  (R., pp.37-59.)  The district court ultimately
determined that Mr. Garnett was an overnight guest and therefore had standing to challenge the
search of the residence.  (R., pp.104-105.)  As Mr. Garnett’s standing to challenge the search of
his closed and locked backpack found inside the residence, is not dependent upon whether this
Court determines he has standing to challenge to search of the residence, he will not address the
district court’s finding in this regard in this Brief. See State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 823
(Ct. App. 2015).
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L.4.)  Mr. Garnett further testified that he did not give officers permission to search his
backpack.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.15, Ls.18-20.)4
Probation officer Jason Haines was assigned to supervise Ms. Brunko and he suspected
she  had  relapsed  on  heroin  after  she  failed  to  complete  a  treatment  program  and  provided  an
altered urine sample.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.21, L.2 – p.24, L.25; p.26, L.24 – p.28, L.3.)  Officer
Haines,  along  with  three  other  probation  officers  and  two  Post  Falls  police  officers,  went  to
Ms. Brunko and Mr. Soy’s residence, a single-wide trailer, after one of Ms. Brunko’s children
had been absent from school for several days.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.7, L.4 – p.8, L.5; p.28, L.4 – p.30,
L.9; p.34, Ls.22-25.)  Officer Haines knocked on the door, Mr. Soy answered, and after verifying
with Mr. Soy that Ms. Brunko still lived at the residence, the officers entered the trailer without
asking permission.5  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.31, L.7 – p.32, L.18.)  Mr. Garnett was laying down on a
chaise lounge when the officers entered.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.32, Ls.5-11.)  After “clearing” the
residence, and although nothing appeared amiss, officers searched for drug-related items and
evidence of Ms. Brunko’s whereabouts, without asking permission.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.32, L.5 –
p.37, L.4.)
4 During the prosecutor’s cross-examination, both Mr. Soy and Mr. Garnett testified that they did
not verbally object when the officers conducted a search of the residence, and Mr. Garnett
testified that he did not verbally object to Officer Haines searching his backpack.  (Tr. 3/21/17,
p.11, L.9 – p.12, L.7; p.17, L.17 – p.19, L.14.)  Their failure to object, however, is not relevant as
mere acquiescence to an assertion of lawful authority does not meet the constitutional definition
of voluntary consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
5 During the suppression hearing, Mr. Soy testified that Officer Haines ordered him to take two
steps back prior to entering the trailer, and told him to sit down.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.8, Ls.6-14.)
Officer Haines and Officer Travis Johnson both testified that Mr. Soy voluntarily backed up and
allowed them to enter without being ordered to.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.31, L.12 – p.32, L.18; p.49, Ls.2-
13.)  The district court found the officers’ testimony to be credible and determined that Mr. Soy
voluntarily let the officers in the residence.  (R., pp.99-100.)  Mr. Garnett does not challenge the
district court’s finding in this regard.
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In a storage room that appeared to be shared by multiple people, Officer Haines found a
backpack and removed it.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.37, L.16 – p.39, L.20.)  The backpack was closed and
had a lock attached to two cords, which were in turn were attached to the zippers.  (Tr. 3/21/17,
p.40, Ls.5-15.)  Not seeing any identifying tags or markings on the backpack, and without asking
either Mr. Soy or Mr. Garnett to whom the backpack belonged,6 Officer  Haines  searched  the
backpack believing he had authority to do so because he “felt that it was very likely that it could”
belong to Ms. Brunko. (Tr. 3/21/17, p.39, L.21 – p.40, L.23; p.46, Ls.13-15.)  Officer Haines
pulled one of the cords, snapping it off of the zipper, unzipped the backpack, looked inside and
found a handgun, ammunition, and a piece of mail addressed to Mr. Garnett.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.41,
L.14 – p.43, L.15.)
On cross-examination, when asked, “[w]hat made you think that that backpack was
Tamara Brunko’s?” Officer Haines responded, “It’s in her residence.  It’s quite possible that it
could  be  her  backpack.   I  didn’t  know for  sure,  but  it  was  quite  possible  it  was  hers.   It’s  not
uncommon for women to have camouflage backpacks and clothing in northern Idaho.  It’s
always a possibility.”  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.45, L.23 – p.46, L.4.)  Officer Haines agreed with defense
counsel’s suggestions that the fact the backpack was in the residence was the only reason he
thought it may have belonged to Ms. Brunko, and that he held “only the belief that it was
possible it was hers” before he opened it.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.46, Ls.5-12.)
The State also submitted a copy of Ms. Brunko’s 2001 judgment placing her on
probation, and a 2014 supervision agreement between Ms. Brunko and the Idaho Department of
6 Mr. Garnett testified that the backpack either had his name or his initials on it (Tr. 3/21/17,
p.17, L.23 – p.19, L.24), while Officer Haines testified that he did not see any identifying
information on the backpack (Tr. 3/21/17, p.39, Ls.21-24).  The district court found Officer
Haines to be more credible on this issue (R., pp.100-101), and Mr. Garnett does not challenge the
district court’s finding that the backpack did not have any identifying information on its exterior.
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Correction.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.26, Ls.9-23; p.47, Ls.3-15; Exs., pp.7-14.)  At the conclusion of the
hearing, the district court allowed the parties to provide additional briefing.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.53.
L.7 – p.54, L.4.)
Mr. Garnett filed an addendum to his brief in support of his motion to suppress in which
he argued that he had reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his closed and locked
backpack; that the waiver provision in Ms. Brunko’s 2011 judgment did not provide the officers
authority to search because the probation officers did not request her consent prior to searching;
and, because the State lacked a search warrant or consent from either Mr. Garnett or Mr. Soy, the
search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  (R., pp.82-89.)  The State responded by
conceding that language in the Fourth Amendment waiver provision in the 2011 judgment
placing  Ms.  Brunko  on  probation  was  not  sufficient  to  justify  the  search,7 but argued that the
search was nevertheless reasonable because Officer Haines had a reasonable suspicion that
Ms.  Brunko  had  violated  the  terms  of  her  probation;  that  Mr.  Soy  consented  to  the  search  by
7 The State presented two separate documents purporting to contain Ms. Brunko’s Fourth
Amendment waiver as a condition of her probation.  (Exs., pp.7-14.)  Mr. Garnett argued to the
district court that the “at the request of” language in the 2011 judgment required probation
officers  to  first  seek  consent  from  Ms.  Brunko  prior  to  searching  her  premises,  and  the  State
acknowledged this argument was meritorious.  (R., pp.87-88, 91-92).  Mr. Garnett’s argument is
supported by this Court’s recent decision in State v. Jaskowski, 2018 Opinion No. 44772
(Jan. 18, 2018) (opinion not yet final).  However, the 2014 supervision agreement submitted by
the  State  and  presumably  considered  by  the  district  court  contains  a  different  waiver  clause
which states, “The defendant waives his/her Fourth Amendment Rights concerning searches.”
(Exs., p.13.)  Because Mr. Garnett did not challenge whether the 2014 supervision agreement
was operative at the time of the search, and in light of this Court’s holding in State v. Gawron,
112 Idaho 841 (1987), Mr. Garnett does not challenge the authority of the officers to search the
premises based upon Ms. Brunko’s purported Fourth Amendment waiver.  In reality, it is likely
that neither of those documents were operative.  Ms. Brunko violated the terms of her probation
in 2016 and an Amended Judgment on Probation Violation was entered on June 14, 2016, likely
containing a new probation supervision agreement and rendering the documents provided to the
district court in this case null. See Register of Actions for State v. Brunko (Kootenai County
district court case number CR-2011-10494) (available via Idaho Supreme Court Data
Repository).
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inviting the probation officers in when he stepped back from the door after verifying that
Ms.  Brunko  still  resided  at  the  trailer;  and,  that  Officer  Haines  had  an  objectively  reasonable
suspicion that the backpack belonged to Ms. Brunko.  (R., pp.90-97.)
The district court entered a written order denying Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress.
(R., pp.98-116.)  Noting that the State did not assert otherwise, the court found that Mr. Garnett
has standing to challenge the search of his backpack as he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the contents of its interior.  (R., pp.105-106.)  However, the court held that the search of
Mr. Garnett’s backpack was reasonable because Officer Haines held an objectively “reasonable
suspicion the Ms. Brunko owned, possessed, or controlled the backpack,” such that her
probationary agreement to waive her Fourth Amendment rights authorized the search.
(R., pp.109-111.)  The court held that “there was no obligation on the probation officers and/or
law enforcement to ask [Mr.] Garnett for permission to search anything found within the single-
wide trailer.”  (R., p.112.)  Instead, the court found that Mr. Garnett “had the duty to inform the
officers … where they would find his backpack and that they did not have his permission to
search his backpack.”  (R., p.113.)8  Finally, the court held that, because probation officers had a
reasonable  suspicion  that  Ms.  Brunko  had  violated  the  terms  of  her  probation,  they  were  not
required to seek Ms. Brunko’s consent prior to searching her residence.  (R., pp.114-115.)
A jury found Mr. Garnett guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the
district court sentenced him to the maximum, five-year fixed term.  (R., pp.215, 265-266.)
Mr. Garnett filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.267-270.)
8 This holding was not supported by citation to any legal authority.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garnett’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
The district court held the warrantless search of Mr. Garnett’s backpack was
constitutional based upon two separate, but related, justifications offered by the State.  First, the
court found the search was justified pursuant to Ms. Brunko’s written consent to waive her
Fourth  Amendment  rights  as  a  condition  of  her  probation.   Alternatively,  the  court  found  the
search was justified because Officer Haines had a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Brunko had
violated the terms of her probation.  The district court erred in both of these rulings.
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Garnett’s Motion To Suppress
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact,
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App.
1996).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
be  free  from  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.   U.S. CONST.  amend.  IV.   Its  purpose  is  “to
impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials,
including law enforcement agents, in order to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions.’” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).  If evidence is not seized either pursuant
to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence
9
discovered  as  a  result  of  the  illegal  search  or  seizure  must  be  excluded  as  the  “fruit  of  the
poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
1. The  Search  Was  Not  Justified  By  Ms.  Brunko’s  Fourth  Amendment  Waiver
Because Officer Haines Did Not Have An Objectively Reasonable Belief
Ms.  Brunko  Had  The  Authority  To  Consent  To  A  Search  Of  Mr.  Garnett’s
Backpack
Mr.  Garnett  does  not  challenge  the  officers’  authority  to  search  Mr.  Soy  and
Ms. Brunko’s residence based upon Ms. Brunko’s purported Fourth Amendment waiver. (See
Exs., pp.10, 13.)  However, Ms. Brunko’s Fourth Amendment waiver did not provide authority
for the officers to search Mr. Garnett’s backpack.
A warrantless search is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it was conducted pursuant
to voluntary consent of a person having the authority to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
US. 218 (1973).  “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or
effects is valid against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).  Alternatively, a warrantless search
conducted pursuant to consent granted by a person who does actually have authority to consent,
may nevertheless be reasonable if the State proves the officer had an objectively reasonable
belief that the consenting person had the authority to consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177 (1990). “Like homes, personal effects are expressly protected from unreasonable search and
seizure by the Fourth Amendment, and an individual’s expectation of privacy in an effect is not
automatically  forfeited  whenever  that  item  is  temporarily  located  within  an  area  over  which  a
third party has authority.” State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 823 (Ct. App. 2015).
It is undisputed that Ms. Brunko did not actually have individual or common authority
over Mr. Garnett’s backpack.  Thus, in order to justify the search based upon Ms. Brunko’s
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Fourth Amendment waiver, the State was required to prove Ms. Brunko had apparent authority
over the backpack; that is, the State had to show Officer Haines had an objectively reasonable
belief that Ms. Brunko did have common authority over the backpack.  The State failed to meet
this standard and the district court erred in denying Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress on this
basis.
a. The District Court Applied An Erroneous “Reasonable Suspicion”
Standard For Determining Apparent Authority
The district court applied an erroneous standard for determining apparent authority.
Relying, in part, upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728,
731-32 (2002), the district court applied a “reasonable suspicion” test to Officer Haines’ actions.
(R., pp.109-111.)  Specifically, the court stated “officers could search any item in the storage
room if they had reasonable suspicion that Brunko owned, possessed or controlled the item,” and
the court found the State met this standard in regard to the backpack.  (R., pp.111.)  The
reasonable suspicion standard adopted by the Barker Court, however, is inconsistent with the
standards governing apparent authority established by the United States Supreme Court.  Rather
than a mere “reasonable suspicion,” the Supreme Court requires a “reasonable belief” that the
person consenting to a search had authority over the premises or effect searched.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized that a search is reasonable if conducted
based upon consent given by a person whom officers reasonably, but erroneously, believe had
the authority to consent, in Rodriguez.  After discussing its precedent analyzing the
“reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the Rodriguez Court held,
We  see  no  reason  to  depart  from  this  general  rule  with  respect  to  facts  bearing
upon the  authority  to  consent  to  a  search.   Whether  the  basis  for  such  authority
exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials
must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires
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is that they answer it reasonably.  The Constitution is no more violated when
officers  enter  without  a  warrant  because  they reasonably (though erroneously)
believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the
premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they
reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who
is about to escape.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-86 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to state,
what we hold today does not suggest that law enforcement officers may always
accept  a  person’s  invitation  to  enter  premises.   Even  when  the  invitation  is
accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives there, the surrounding
circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would doubt its
truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.  As with other factual
determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter
must “be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the
officer at the moment ... ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ ” that
the consenting party had authority over the premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).  If not, then warrantless entry
without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the
search is valid.
Id. at 188-89 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has also recognized that, “[t]he standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’
reasonableness – what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)
(citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-89) (further citations omitted).  In Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103 (2006), the Court again applied the “reasonable belief” standard:  “The Fourth
Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the
voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over
the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” Id.
at 106 (citing Rodriguez; Matlock.)  In short, the United States Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that in order to justify a search based upon apparent authority to consent to
12
search, the State must demonstrate that the officer “reasonably believed” the consenting party
had the authority to do so.
In Barker, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed whether the search of the defendant’s fanny
pack could be justified by a Fourth Amendment waiver executed by her boyfriend when he was
placed on felony parole. Barker, 136 Idaho at 729-31.  Without noting the reasonable belief
standard articulated in Rodriguez, and instead relying upon a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991), the Barker Court stated, “When
searching that room pursuant to [boyfriend’s] consent, the officers could search any item in the
bedroom if they had reasonable suspicion that [boyfriend] owned, possessed, or controlled the
item.” Barker, 136 Idaho at 731-32.  The Barker Court’s reliance upon Davis, rather than
Rodriguez, was misplaced.
In Davis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search of a safe conducted
pursuant to a third-party’s probationary search condition. Davis, 932 F.2d at 754-58.  Relying
upon precedent establishing that a probationer may be searched if the probation officer has
reasonable  suspicion  to  believe  that  the  probationer  violated  the  terms  of  probation,  the Davis
Court held, “police  must  have  reasonable  suspicion,  that  an  item  to  be  searched  is  owned,
controlled, or possessed by probationer, in order for the item to fall within the permissible
bounds of a probation search.” Id. 932 F.2d at 758 (citing Griffith v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
872-73 (1987); United States v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176, 179 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Johnson, 722 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st
Cir. 1990) (further citations omitted).)  A person’s status as a probationer comes with a
diminished expectation of privacy. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-20 (2001).
The Davis Court was concerned with the scope of a search justified by the probationer’s
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diminished expectation of privacy, not the standard for determining whether a probationer (or
anyone else for that matter) had apparent authority to authorize a particular search.  Probationary
status, however, does not alter a person’s common authority over places and effects.  The Barker
Court failed to recognize this distinction.
In any event, neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are
the ultimate arbiter of the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); James v. City of Boise, 136 S.Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (recognizing
“[t]he Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court's
interpretation of federal law”). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if the
State wishes to justify a search based upon consent, the State must demonstrate that consent was
actually and voluntarily given by one who either has the authority to consent, or by one who
officers reasonably believe has the authority to consent. See Schneckloth; Matlock; Rodriguez;
Jimeno; Randolph, supra.
A standard requiring the State to show merely that an officer reasonably suspects that an
effect belongs to an individual who has granted consent to search is no different than a standard
requiring the State to show merely that an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person
actually and voluntarily consented to the search at all.  Such a standard is inconsistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent.
b. Officer Haines Did Not Have An Objectively Reasonable Belief That
Ms. Brunko Had Common Authority Over Mr. Garnett’s Backpack Such
That The Search Could Be Justified By Ms. Brunko’s Waiver
Officer  Haines  testified  that  the  only  reasons  he  “felt  that  it  was  quite  possible”  the
backpack “could be” Ms. Brunko’s, was because it was found in her residence, and its “not
uncommon for women to have camouflage backpacks and clothing in northern Idaho.  Its’s
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always a possibility.” (Tr. 3/21/17, p.39, L.21 – p.40, L.23; p.45, L.23 – p.46, L.12.)  Without
more, the mere fact that a backpack (or any other container that is typically used to conceal a
person’s private effects), is found in a shared residence, is not enough to support a reasonable
belief that each resident has common authority over the backpack.  Officer Haines himself
recognized as much when he acknowledged that it was only “possible” that the backpack
belonged to Ms. Brunko.  Under the totality of the circumstances, it was not reasonable for
Officer Haines to believe Ms. Brunko had common authority over Mr. Garnett’s backpack.
The date of the search was not Officer Haines’ first visit to the residence.  The month
prior, Officer Haines conducted an inspection of the Soy/Brunko residence to determine its
suitability for Ms. Brunko’s probation, while Ms. Brunko was at a residential treatment program.
(Tr. 3/21/17, p.29, L.15 – p.30, L.6.)  Mr. Soy was at home at the time and consented to Officer
Haines’ search.  (3/21/17, p.30, Ls.7-9.)  Other individuals were in the residence at the time,
including another probationer and a person who had an active warrant.  (3/21/17, p.33, Ls.10-
22.)9  During that initial inspection, Officer Haines looked in the storage room at Mr. Soy’s
invitation.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.37, L.16 – p.38, L.5.)  Through his two visits, Officer Haines became
aware that at least 6 people had access to the storage room:  Mr. Garnett, Mr. Soy, the two
people present during the initial home inspection; Ms. Brunko; and Ms. Brunko’s child.  (See
generally Tr.3/21/17.)  He testified that the storage area looked like it was being used by multiple
people.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.38, L.21 – p.39, L.5.)
The totality of the circumstances known to Officer Haines at the time he searched
Mr. Garnett’s backpack would not lead a person of reasonable caution to believe Ms. Brunko had
9 It is unclear whether the probationer was the same person who had the active warrant, but the
use of the plural “individuals” suggests that there were at least two people in addition to Mr. Soy
who were present during the home inspection.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.33, Ls.10-22.)
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authority  to  consent  to  its  search,  regardless  of  Officer  Haines’  observation  of  the  fashion
sensibilities of northern Idaho women.  Although the search was not unconstitutional merely
because Officer Haines did not take the simple step of asking Mr. Soy and Mr. Garnett who
owned the backpack, a search justified by voluntary consent requires the State to show more than
willful ignorance on the part of the officer. See generally Rodriguez.  The State, therefore, failed
to prove the search of Mr. Garnett’s backpack was justified by Ms. Brunko’s Fourth Amendment
waiver, and the district court erred in denying Mr. Garnett’s motion to suppress on that basis.
2. The  Search  Was  Not  Justified  By  A  Reasonable  Suspicion  That  Ms.  Brunko
Violated The Terms Of Her Probation Because The State Failed To Demonstrate
There Was Probable Cause To Believe Evidence Of Ms. Brunko’s Probation
Violation Would Be Found In The Backpack
Although Officer Haines reasonably suspected Ms. Brunko violated the terms of her
probation, that reasonable suspicion did not justify the search of Mr. Garnett’s backpack.  A
probationer has a diminished expectation of privacy. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-20.  Therefore,
“[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is
engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an
intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.” Id. at
121.  Mr. Garnett, however, was not on probation and therefore did not have a diminished
expectation of privacy in the contents of his backpack.  In order to justify the search of
Mr. Garnett’s backpack, the State was required to show there was probable cause to believe
evidence of Ms. Brunko’s probation violation would be found in the backpack.
In State v. Ruck, 155 Idaho 475 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court used its plenary power
to hear the appeal of a probationer’s employer who filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 41 for the
return of its laptop, which was seized during a probation search of its employee. Id. at 477-79.
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Probation offers conducted a home visit to inquire about the probationer, Ruck, attempting to
purchase a firearm in violation of Idaho law (and presumably the terms of his probation). Id. at
478.  A probation officer found a backpack and, after verifying the backpack belonged to the
probationer, opened it and found a laptop computer along with evidence that Ruck had violated
his probation by traveling out of state. Id. Ruck told the officer that the computer belonged to
his employer, but the probation officer seized it anyway with the intent of searching it later. Id.
The employer filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 41 seeking return of the laptop, and a restraining
order preventing law enforcement from searching its contents. Id.
The Ruck Court noted that the legality of the laptop’s seizure was not based upon the
consent to search provisions Ruck agreed to when he was placed on probation. Id. at 483.
Instead, the Court examined the application of the plain-view doctrine.  “If, during a lawful
search of a private area, an officer sees an object in plain view, the incriminating character of the
object is immediately apparent, and the officer has a lawful right to access the object, the officer
may  seize  it.” Id. at 482 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)). “The
officer must have probable cause to believe that the object is evidence of a crime or contraband.”
Id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987)). “The Supreme Court has stated that
‘in the case of “mere evidence,” probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe
that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.’” Id. (quoting
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)).  The Ruck Court noted that the
United States Supreme Court had yet to determine whether the plain-view doctrine permits the
seizure of evidence of a probation violation, but found the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in United
States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2007), to be compelling, and held “the plain-view
doctrine applies to evidence of a probation violation.” Id.
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The Ruck Court declined to address whether a probationer’s diminished expectation of
privacy means that an officer need only have a reasonable suspicion that an item seen in plain-
view contains evidence of a crime or contraband, rather than the normally required probable
cause, in order to justify its seizure. Id. at 483.  The district court held that it was reasonable for
the officers to believe the laptop contained evidence that Ruck violated the terms of his
probation, and the employer did not challenge that finding. Id.   Nevertheless,  the  Court
recognized “[t]he interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable
seizures is quite different from the interest protected against unreasonable searches.” Id. at 484
(citing Arizona v. Hicks,  480  U.S.  at  328).   The  Court  held  that,  absent  consent  from  the
employer, “the State cannot search the laptop without a warrant issued based upon a judicial
determination that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of Employee's probation
violation is contained in the laptop.” Id.
The  district  court  found  that  Officer  Haines  had  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that
Ms. Brunko had violated the terms of her probation, which was an independent justification for
the residential search.  (R., pp.113-115.)  However, the court did not specifically address the
application of the plain-view doctrine to the seizure of Mr. Garnett’s backpack, and did not
address whether there was probable cause to believe evidence of Ms. Brunko’s probation
violation would be found in the backpack.  (R., pp.98-116.)  The court appears to have assumed
that, as long as Officer Haines had a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Brunko owned, possessed, or
controlled the backpack, the officer had the authority to seize it and search its contents.
(R., pp.109-115.)  Nevertheless, a review of the evidence presented demonstrated that the State
failed to prove Officer Haines had probable cause to search the backpack.
18
Assuming, but not conceding, that the lesser “reasonable suspicion” standard applied to
the seizure of his backpack based upon it being found in plain-view during the probationary
search,10 Mr.  Garnett  asserts  that  there  was  no  probable  cause  to  believe  evidence  of
Ms. Brunko’s probation violations would be found in the backpack.11  Officer Haines testified
that it is not uncommon for probationers to place items in locked containers in an attempt to
dissuade officers from searching those containers.  (Tr. 3/21/17, p.37, Ls.5-15.)  Keeping the
contents of a closed and locked container from the view of others is, of course, the very purpose
of containers that can be closed and locked, and this fact does not establish probable cause.
Additionally, Officer Haines knew only that the backpack may have belonged to Ms. Brunko,
not that it did belong to her. (Tr. 3/21/17, p.39, L.21 – p.40, L.23; p.45, L.23 – p.46, L.12.)  The
State cannot meet its burden of showing Officer Haines had probable cause to believe evidence
of Ms. Brunko’s probation violation(s) would be found in Mr. Garnett’s backpack, when it could
not even establish that he had a reasonable belief that it was Ms. Brunko’s backpack to begin
with.  In short, the State failed to establish probable cause to search Mr. Garnett’s backpack
based upon reasonable suspicion that Ms. Brunko violated the terms of her probation.
10 The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects – it does not protect houses, papers, or effects, independently from an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy therein. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351-52 (1967).  Probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy. See Knights, 534 U.S. at
118-20.  A probationer’s family, friends, and neighbors do not suffer their own diminished
expectation of privacy merely due to their relationship to the probationer. It seems unlikely that
applying a “reasonable suspicion” standard to the plain-view doctrine would meet the standards
set by the United States Supreme Court, unless it was first established that the probationer had
authority to control the item in question.
11 The State’s failure to seek a warrant should, in and of itself, be fatal to its claim that the search
was justified by suspicion Ms. Brunko violated the terms of her probation. See Ruck, 155 Idaho
at 484.  Nevertheless, because the district court found the search could be justified on this basis,
Mr. Garnett will address the probable cause issue in this Brief.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Garnett respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for felon in
possession  of  a  firearm,  and  reverse  the  district  court’s  order  which  denying  his  motion  to
suppress.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
20
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of February, 2018, I served a true and correct





125 N 8TH WEST
ST ANTHONY ID 83445
JOHN T MITCHELL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
SEAN P WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas
